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The Role of Information Sampling in Risky Choice 
Ralph Hertwig, Greg Barron, Elke U. Weber, 
and Ido Erev 
Life is a gamble. True to the cliche, we can rarely be certain of the conse-
quences of our everyday actions. Presumably because of life's lack of cer-
tainty, much of the psychological research on decision making under risk 
is devoted to the study of choices between monetary garnbles or prospects. 
With few exceptions, the outcomes and outcome probabilities of such garn-
bles are explicitly described to the decision maker before he or she makes 
a choice. How often are life's gambles described in this way? When we 
decide whether to back up our computer's hard drive, cross a busy street, 
or go out on a date, we often do not know the cornplete range of the pos-
sible outcomes, let alone their probabilities. Yet we routinely rnake such 
decisions, usually without difficulty. We do so by drawing upon our expe-
rience with the relevant prospects, for instance, by recalling the outcornes 
of previous choices. Though effective, sampling from experience brings 
with it the potential to generate a skewed picture of the risky prospects 
we face. As we will argue here, this potential is greatest when the outcome 
probabilities are small and relatively few outcomes have been experienced 
by the decision maker. Under these circumstances, decisions derived from 
experience are likely tobe systematically different from those rnade in full 
knowledge of the outcomes and outcome probabilities. 
In this chapter, we investigate risky decisions made on the basis of sam-
pled experience. Three findings deserve emphasis. First, when outcome in-
formation is sampled, the likelihood of rare events is often underestimated. 
Second, when the sampling process is sequential, more recent outcomes 
tend to receive more weight than do earlier outcomes. Third, in decisions 
from experience, the option that appears best in light of the experienced 
sample tends to be the one selected. To account for these effects, we pro-
pose a learning mechanism that models how people update their estimates 
of a risky prospect's value in light of newly sampled outcomes. 
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CALL ME ISHMAEL. Some years ago - never mind how long precisely - having 
little or no money in my purse, and nothing particular to interest me on shore, I 
thought I would sail about a little and see the watery part of the world. (Melville, 
1851/1993, p. 1) 
Thus begins Moby Dick, and with it the voyage of the Pequod and her 
captain, Ahab - a voyage of which Ishmael will be the sole survivor. With 
its myriad metaphors, symbols, and characters, Herman Melville's great 
novel has been interpreted as everything from a saga about Promethean de-
termination and undying hatred to allegories about the Gold Rush, man's 
quest for knowledge, or man's will to master nature. Yet Moby Dick is also 
a fascinating factual chronicle of nineteenth-century whaling as revealed 
in the hardships, routines, and adventures of the men aboard the Pequod. 
As Melville (1851/1993, pp. 321-322) portrayed it, whale hunting was a 
high-stakes gamble: 
But here be it premised, that owing to the unwearied activity with which of late they 
have been hunted over all four oceans, the Sperm Whales, instead of almost invari-
ably sailing in small detached companies, as in former times, are now frequently 
met with in extensive herds, sometimes embracing so great a multitude, that it 
would almost seem as if numerous nations of them had sworn solemn league and 
covenant for mutual assistance and protection. To this aggregation of the Sperm 
Whale into such immense caravans, may be imputed the circumstance that even 
in the best cruising grounds, you may now sometimes sail for weeks and months 
together, without being greeted by a single spout; and then be suddenly saluted by 
what sometimes seems thousands on thousands. 
The whalers aboard the Pequod were forced to make decisions about, 
for instance, the course of their ship under conditions that can be de-
scribed in decision-theoretic terms as ignorance of the options' outcomes 
and probabilities. Although they hoped that sailing in known cruising 
grounds would increase their chance of being at the rig~t place at the right 
time, they knew neither how large the herds they came across would be 
nor the probability of such encounters. Instead of guessing, however, the 
whalers most likely relied on their experience from previous hunting ex-
peditions. Moreover, they were able to update their expectations in light of 
new samples of information. In this view, each day on which they cruised 
waters that the sperm whale was believed to frequent could be seen as 
a draw from a payoff distribution. After sequentially accumulating expe-
rience about a specific cruising ground, they would decide to stay or to 
abandon it. 
Of course, decisions in which knowledge about the outcomes and out-
come probabilities is scant are not unique to nineteenth-century whaling. In 
fact, ignorance or at least partial ignorance of outcomes and their probabil-
ities may be the rule rather than the exception in many everyday decisions. 
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Like Melville' s whalers, decision makers then can rely on past experie~ce and continue to sample information about such prospects before makmg 
a decision. We have referred to this category of decisions as decisions from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004). 
. 
As the metaphor of life as a gamble implies, decisions from expe.n~nce represent a bet on the future that is based on one' s necessarily hmited experience of the past. Indeed, the gambling metaphor has inspired ~ good deal of the psychological research on decision making. On the bas~s of a review of the early literature such as Savage's (1954) The Foundatwns 0f Statistics, Goldstein and Weber (1997, p. 569) concluded the following: Gambling decisions were believed tobe prototypical of virtually all decisions. Al-most any contemplated action, for example, where to go to school, what job to t~ke, or whom to marry, will have consequences that cannot be predicted with certai~ty but which vary in their likelihood and desirability. In this sense, then, real-hfe decisions have the same structure as gambles. Moreover, because this applies to virtually all decisions, life is a gamble. 
Given this background, it is not surprising that monetary gambles be-came the fruit fly of decision research (Lopes, 1983). Just as biologists use the Drosophila as a model organism to study, for instance, genetic in-heritance, so psychologists use the monetary gamble as a model task to study, for instance, decision making under risk. A monetary gamble is a well-defined alternative consisting of n outcomes (n = 1, 2, 3, ... , I<) and those outcomes' probabilities. In the typical notation, the gamble "$32, .1; 0 otherwise" yields an outcome of $32 with a 10% chance, and an outcome of O with a 90% chance. A dilemma is introduced by presenting people with two such gambles and asking them to say which one they prefer. For instance, they may be asked to choose between the following two gambles: 
$32, .1; 0 otherwise $3 for sure. 
1f people maximize expected value, they will decide against the sure gam-ble because the two-outcome gamble offers the higher expected value, $3.20.
1 
Now compare this choice with the choices faced by the whalers aboard the Pequod or, to turn to a present-day example, with those faced by over-weight people considering whether to go on a diet. Although the diet has the potential to help them reduce their weight, it rnay have undesirable side e~fects, the n~ture ~nd probability of which are relatively unknown. Con-s1der the Atkms d1et. lts recommendation to shun carbohydrates and eat any arnount of fat contradicts the predominant view in the field of nutrition 
1 The principle of choosing the option with the highest expected value (EV) is expressed as 
E V == I: p; x;, where p; and x; are the probability and the amount of money, respectively, 
of each possible outcome (i = 1, ... , n) of a gamble. 
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that a weight-loss diet should be low in fat and high in starch. Two recent 
studies published in the Annals of Interna! Medicine, however, appear to 
validate the Atkins approach (Sternetal., 2004; Yancy et al., 2004). These 
studies found that the diet results not only in weight loss but also in car-
diovascular health benefits and improved blood sugar, prompting some 
nutritionists to warn of the diet's unknown health effects in the long term 
(Big News, 2004). Thus, even when rigorous research results are avail-
able, life is indeed a gamble. Because risky prospects do not necessarily 
come with convenient descriptions of all possible outcomes and outcome 
probabilities, people must often rely on their experience to choose among 
them. 
What do we know about the psychology underlying such experience-
based decisions? Almost nothing. This is because researchers have fo-
cused almost exclusively on what we have called decisions from description 
(Hertwig et al., 2004). The goal of this chapter is to explore the important 
dass of decisions from experience. As we demonstrate shortly, investi-
gating decisions from experience does not require researchers to abandon 
their Drosophila. Choices among monetary gambles can be constructed 
~uch that people sample information from the payoff distributions - that 
is, garner experience of the outcomes and outcome probabilities - before 
they select among them. 
DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE IN MONETARY GAMBLES 
How much information do decision makers sample from payoff distribu-
tions before they feel ready to choose among them? Will their choices differ 
from those based on complete descriptions of the gambles? To address these 
questions, Hertwig et al. (2004) presented students at the Technion (Haifa, 
Israel) with the six risky choice problems displayed in Table 4.1. The two 
gambles in each problem differed from one another with regard to both 
expected value and variability. Of the six problems, four required choos-
ing among positive prospects (gains), and two required choosing among 
negative prospects (losses). 
Unlike in most studies of risky choice, respondents were not given the 
gambles' outcomes and probabilities. lnstead, they. were afforded the op-
portunity to sample information about the properhes of the two gambles 
in each problem. Specifically, each respondent was shown two boxes on 
a computer screen and was told that each box represented a payoff dis-
tribution. Clicking 011 a given box triggered random sampling (with re-
placement) of an outcome from its distribution. Respondents could sample 
outcomes from the boxes as often as and in whatever order they desired. 
They were encouraged, however, to sample until they felt confident enough 
to decide from which of the two boxes they would prefer to draw given 
that their next draw would have real monetary consequences. After they 
had stopped sampling and indicated their choice, they proceeded to the 
~ 
TABLE 4.1. Summary of the Choice Problemsand Results 
Percentage Choosing H 
Prediction for H Choicesb Gamblesa Expected Value Experience Difference 
Choice Description 
Problem H L H L Group Group Rare Event HChoices Between Groupsc 
1 1,:§ 3 3.2 3 36 88 0,.2 Higher -52(z = 3.79; p = .000) 2 1'1 3, .25 .8 .75 64 44 4,.2 Lower +20(z = 1.42, p = .176) 3 -3 -32,J -3 -3.2 64 28 -32, .1 Lower -36(z = 2.55, p = .005) 4 -3 -4,] -3 -3.2 28 56 0,.2 Higher +28(z = 2.01, p = .022) 5 32,J 3 3.2 3 48 20 32, .1 Lower +28(z = 2.09, p = .018) 6 32, .025 3, .25 .8 .75 64 12 32, .025 Lower -52(z = 3.79, p = .000) a Underlining indicates the gamble including the rare event. H, gamble wi.th the higher expected value; L, gamble with the lower expected value. b The entries in this column identify the rare event and indicate whether the percentage of respondents choosing the H gamble was expected tobe higher or lower in the experience group than in the description group, assuming underweighting of rare events in the experience group. c This columnshows the percentage of H choices in the experience group minus the percentage of H choices in the description group, along with the z statistic testing whether the difference between the two sample proportions is significantly different from zero. Source: "Decisions from experience and the effect of rare events in risky choice;' by R. Hertwig, G. Barron, E.U. Weber and I. Erev, 200-1, Psychological Science, 15, p. 536. Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Society. Reprinted with permission. 
,. ,, 
;•\ 
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next problem. After making all six choices, they played out their preferred 
gambles and received the associated payoffs. In both groups, participants 
received a $4.50 show-up fee and 2</, for each point won (e.g., the outcome 
32 was worth 64</,). 
Let us turn to Problem 1 in Table 4.1 to illustrate the procedure. This 
problem offers a choice between two payoff distributions: a sure-thing 
distribution in which every draw yields 3, and a risky-prospect distribution 
in which a draw results in 4 or 0, with the former outcome being four times 
as likely as the latter outcome (.8 versus .2). One respondent in Hertwig 
et al.'s (2004) study sampled seven times from the sure-thing distribution, 
each time encountering 3, and sampled eight times from the risky-prospect 
distribution, finding O once and 4 seven times. Which one did she choose? 
She selected the risky prospect, as did 88% of respondents. 
How does this context compare with one in which people do not need to 
develop their own representations of the gambles? Hertwig et al.'s (2004) 
study addressed this question by including a second group of respondents. 
Whereas those in the aforementioned experience group (n = 50) learned 
about each gamble' s outcomes and outcome probabilities by sampling infor-
mation from the payoff distributions, respondents in the description group 
(n = 50) received complete information (using the notation introduced in 
the foregoing) about each gamble's outcomes and outcome probabilities. 
Table 4.1, which shows the choices by group for each of the six problems, 
illustrates the striking differences between decisions from descriptions and 
decisions from experience. In Problems 2, 3, and 6 as well as in Problem 5, 
respondents in the description group were more likely to select the gamble 
with the higher expected value, H, than were respondents in the experience 
group; in Problems 1 and 4, the pattern was reversed. Except in Problem 2, 
all differences in the proportion of H choices were statistically significant. 
Hertwig et al. (2004) proposed that the crucial difference between deci-
sions from description and decisions from experience resides in the psy-
chological impact of rare events on each type of decision. According to the 
dominant psychological theory of decision making under risk, prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), people 
choose between risky prospects as if small-probability events receive more 
weight than they deserve given their objective probabilities and as if large-
probability events receive less weight than they deserve given their ob-
jective probabilities.2 Prospect theory's weighting function, however, is 
2 Prospect theory's decision-weight function plots weights that range from O to 1 against 
objective probabilities: Points above the 45° diagonal signal overweighting; that is, they 
represent weights that exceed the outcomes' objective probability of occurrence. Points 
below the 45° diagonal signal the opposite pattern. Note that such decision weights are not 
assumed to reflect any explicit judgment of the subjective probability of outcomes. Instead, 
weights are inferred from choices and provide a measure of an outcome's impact on a 
decision. 
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based exclusively on studies in which respondents received explicit d\-
scriptions of the gambles' outcomes and probabilities. Conseque:ntli 
Hertwig et al. proposed that in decisions from description people choo~~ 
between risky gambles as if they overweight low-probability events relati,,e 
to their objective probability of occurrence, consistent with prospect theory 
whereas in decisions from experience they choose as if they underweig11~ 
low-probability events.3 
To see how this pattern of weighting of rare events is consistent wHh 
the observed choices, look again at Problem 1, in which the rare evel\t 
(i.e., 0) occurs with a probability of .2. If in decisions from descriptitin 
the rare outcome has more than its due impact on the attractiveness t::,t 
the option, then respondents will tend to prefer the sure outcome 3 over tl\e 
risky prospect 4 with probability .8. Indeed, 64% of respondents in the d~-
scription group chose the sure thing in Problem 1 (Table 4.1). If in decisiol\s 
from experience the rare outcome has less than its due impact on the .:"\t-
tractiveness of the option, then respondents will tend to prefer the risl,y 
prospect to the sure thing. Indeed, the !arge majority of respondents in tl\e 
experience group selected the risky prospect in Problem 1 (Table 4.1). 
More generally, Table 4.1 shows that, in each of the six problems, the p<lt-
tern of H choices in the description and experience groups was consisteM 
with that expected assuming that people choose as if they underweigltt 
rare events in decisions from experience and overweight rare events ln 
decisions from description (see the Prediction for H choices column in Tu-
ble 4.1). Comparison of Problems 1 and 2 highlights this difference in tl\e 
weighting of rare events. Linear weighting of probabilities implies th11.t 
a given person will have the same preference in Problem 1 as in Prob-
lem 2 (i.e., the person will prefer H or L in both problems, dependir1g 
on his or her utility function). In contrast, overweighting of rare events 
(p < .25) implies more H choices in Problem 2 than in Problem 1, aI)d 
underweighting of rare events implies the opposite preference. Kahnemc1.n 
and Tversky (1979) observed 65% H choices in Problem 2 and 20% H choic~s 
in Problem 1. They interpreted this result, a violation of expected utility 
theory known as the Allais paradox, as an instance of overweighting of 
rare events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). [For other violations that 
prospect theory explains in terms of overweighting of rare events, S(:e 
Camerer (2000) and Tversky & Kahneman (1992).] As Table 4.1 shows, 
the majority choices in the description group replicate those observed by 
Kahneman and Tversky, whereas those in the experience group show the 
reverse pattern. 
Although people in the experience and description groups responded 
to structurally identical choice problems, their choices were dramatically 
3 Here we define a low-probability, rare event in a preliminary and somewhat arbitr<1ry 
fashion as an event with a probability less than or equal to .2. 
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different. Respondents in the experience group sequentially sampled out-
comes from the respective payoff distributions and chose between op-
tions as if they underweighted rare events. Respondents in the description 
group received complete outcome and probability information and chose 
between options as if they overweighted rare events. Hertwig et al.' s (2004) 
findings corroborate those observed in a small set of other studies that in-
vestigated decisions from experience (e.g., Barkan, Zohar, & Erev, 1998; 
Barron & Erev, 2003; Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 2004). The question is, why 
do people choose as if they underweight rare events in decisions from 
experience? 
INFORMATION SEARCH IN DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE 
Decisions from experience depend on what outcomes are sampled before 
the decision is made. Therefore, any account of the experience-description 
distinction ought to consider how much information people sample from 
the gambles' payoff distributions and how they combine the sampled in-
formation into a judgment of the gambles' attractiveness. We first address 
the issue of sample size and then investigate the impact of recency on the 
updating of sampled information. 
Sample Size Mauers 
Figure 4.1 shows the median number of draws per problem in the ex-
perience group. Two observations are noteworthy. First, people sampled 
almost equally often from each payoff distribution in each problem. Sec-
ond, the total number of draws per problem was relatively small, with a 
median of 15 draws. 
Whatever the reasons for people's limited search effort,4 it has an obvi-
ous consequence: The smaller the number of draws, the larger the proba-
bility that a decision maker will never come across rare events, remaining 
ignorant of their existence. Table 4.2 presents the number of respondents 
who never encountered the rare event in the experience group. For illus-
tration, consider Problem 5. Here the median respondent sampled seven 
cards from the payoff distribution that offered 32 with probability .1 (and 
0 otherwise). As a consequence, 68% of respondents (17 out of 25) never 
encountered the good but rare outcome 32. Across the six problems, the 
rare event was not encountered in 44% of all sampling sequences. 
4 One explanation involves short-term memory Jimits that provide a natural stopping ru!e for 
information acquisition (Kareev, 2000). In fact, more than half of respondents in Hertwig 
et al.'s (2004) experience group sampled exclusively from one payoff distribution before 
switching to the other one. The median number of draws from each option was around 
seven, a number often associated with the capacity of short-term memory. 
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H: (4,0.8) (4,0.2) (-3, 1) (-3.1) (32,0.1) (32, 0.025; 
L: (3, 1) (3,0.25) (-32,0.1) (-4,0.8) (3, 1) (3,0.25) 
FIGURE 4.1. Median nurnber of draws in the experience group in each of the si\ 
choice problerns (see Table 4.1). Hand L represent the gambles with the highet 
and lower expected value, respectively. Frorn "Decisions from experience and th~ 
effect of rare events in risky choice," by R. Hertwig, G. Barron, E. U. Weber an\i 
L Erev, 2004, Psychological Science, 15, p. 537. Copyright 2004 by the Americ8h 
Psychological Society. Reprinted with perrnission. 
Ignorance of the rare event appears to have a clear impact on the subs~-
quent choice (see the Choosing Rare-Event Gamble columns in Table 4.2). 
When the rare event was "good" relative to other outcomes, as in Problems 
2, 4, 5, and 6, not encountering it virtually assured that respondents did nQt 
select the gamble involving the rare event, whereas encountering it at lea%t 
once raised the chance of choosing the rare-event gamble to about 50%. 
When the rare event was "bad" relative to other outcomes, as in ProbleIT\s 
1 and 3, the opposite was true. When respondents never encountered the 
rare event, they always selected the gamble involving the rare event. lh 
contrast, encountering it at least once reduced the chance of choosing the 
rare-event gamble to about 66%. 
As well as increasing the risk of never encountering the rare event, 
drawing a small sample makes it more probable that one will encount~r 
the rare event less frequently than expected given its objective probability. 
This is because the binomial distribution for the number of times a partk-
ular outcome will be observed in n independent trials is markedly skewed 
when p is small (i.e, the event is rare) and n is small (i.e., few outcom~s 
are sampled). For such distributions, one is more likely to encounter the 
rare event less frequently than expected (np) than more frequently than 
expected. For illustration, let us assume that 1,000 people sample from 
a distribution in which the critical event has a probability of .1 and esti-
mate the event's probability tobe the proportion in whatever sample they 
CO ..... 
TABLE 4.2. Sample History and Choice 
Gamblesa 
Choosing Rare Event Choosing 
Choice Rare Event Rare-Event Encountered Rare-Event 
Problem H L NeverSeen Gamble (at Least Once) Gamble 
1 4, .8 3 11 11 14 11 
Q,_,2_bad 
2 1,.:2.good 3, .25 7 0 18 11 
0,.8 o, .75 
3 -3 -32,.J.bad 10 10 15 8 
o, .9 
4 -3 -4,.8 2 0 23 11 
Q,.:2.good 
5 32, J.good 3 17 1 8 4 
o, .9 
6 32, .025 good 3, .25 19 1 6 2 
o, .985 o, .75 
• Under!ining indicates the rare event. Each rare event is indicated as either good or bad relative to other outcomes. H, gamble with 
the higher expected value; L, gamble with the lower expected value. 
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observe. Each person samples 20 times. Of the 1,000 people, 285 will ob-
serve the critical event twice and thus are likely to estimate its probability 
accurately. Another 392 will never observe the critical event or will observe 
it only once and thus will probably underestimate p. The remaining people 
(323) will encounter the crucial event 3, 4, 5, ... , or 20 times and thus are 
likely to overestimate its probability. Note that, averaged across the 1,000 
people, the estimated probability of the rare event will equal its probability 
in the population (i.e., .1) because the sample proportion is an unbiased 
estimator of the proportion in the population. However, for small samples, 
more people will encounter the rare event less frequently than expected 
rather than more frequently than expected. 
Hertwig et al. (2004) averaged the number of times that respondents 
encountered the rare event across all six problems in the experience group 
and found that, consistent with the analysis of the binomial distribution, 
78% of respondents encountered the rare event less frequently than ex-
pected (i.e., fewer than np times) whereas 22% of respondents encountered 
the rare event as frequently or more frequently than expected. In addi-
tion, the experienced frequency of the critical event had a clear impact on 
choices. When the rare event was "good" (e.g., 32 in Problem 5), the option 
involving it was selected in only 23% of cases in which it was encountered 
less frequently than expected. The same option was selected in 58% of 
cases in which it was encountered as frequently or more frequently than 
expected. Similarly, when the rare event was "bad" (e.g., 0 in Problem 1), 
the option involving it was selected in 92% of cases in which it was en-
countered less frequently than expected but in only 50% of cases in which 
it was encountered as frequently or more frequently than expected. 
These results show that, in the small samples drawn by respondents 
in Hertwig et al.'s (2004) study, the experienced relative frequencies of 
rare events were on average smaller than the rare events' objective prob-
abilities. lt is therefore plausible that, even if people correctly recalled all 
the experienced outcomes and computed the probabilities based on the 
outcomes' frequencies in the sample, they tended to underestimate the prob-
ability of rare events. In this context, underestimation does not necessarily 
imply psychological distortion but rather a kind of information sampling 
(i.e., drawing small samples) that gives rise to a distorted picture of the 
world. 
Given that many of the respondents received input that would give 
them a skewed picture of the objective probabilities, how good were their 
choices? To address this question, we computed the expected value of each 
gamble for each respondent on the basis of tlze outcomes tlzat he or slze observed. 
Viewed in light of the samples they drew, respondents generally acted like 
expected value maximizers: Across the six problems, respondents chose the 
gamble that according to the sample promised the higher expected value 
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in 74% of cases. Only 44% of choices, however, maximized the expected 
value as calculated on the basis of the objective probabilities. 
Sampling Order Matters 
Decisions from experience require people to update their impression 
of the desirability of a gamble by combining newly sampled outcomes 
with previously sampled outcomes. If all observations received an equal 
weight - that is, a weight of 1 / n, where n is the number of observations 
sampled from a payoff distribution - then the order in which observations 
are sampled would not matter. Both the expected value calculus and 
the expected utility calculus are impervious to order effects. Research 
on memory (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) and belief-updating (e.g., 
Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992), however, show that the order in which evi-
dence is presented to people matters even in tasks where it should be 
irrelevant (e.g., in free recall of the content of lists or in overall impressions 
of the value of choice options when outcorrtes are randomly sampled). 
One order phenomenon is the recency effect, according to which obser-
vations made late in a sequence of observations receive more weight than 
they deserve (i.e., more than 1/n). Such an effect would result in choices 
consistent with underweighting of rare events. To see why, let us assume 
the most extreme form of recency, in which the attra,ctiveness of a gamble 
is determined solely by the most recently sampled outcome. Let us further 
assume that each of 100 people sample from two distributions: distribu-
tion A, in which the rare event, 32, has a probability of .1 and the common 
event, 0, has a probability of .9, and distribution B, in which 3 occurs for 
certain. After any number of draws, only 10 of the 100 people, on average, 
will have encountered 32 in their most recent draw from distribution A; 
the rest will have encountered O in that draw. Moreover, all of them will 
have encountered 3 in the most recent draw from distribution B. If only the 
most recent draw per distribution matters to a gamble's attractiveness, it 
is likely that the majority of participants will prefer distribution B over A, 
resulting in a modal choice that is consistent with underweighting of rare 
events. In other words, in decisions resulting from continuous updating 
of outcome probabilities, the recency effect can produce choices that make 
people look as if they underweight rare events. 
To examine whether recency affected decisions in the experience group, 
Hertwig et al. (2004) split, for each choice problem and each respondent, 
the outcomes sampled from each option according to whether they fell 
in the first half or the second half of the sample sequence. After computing 
the options' average payoffs according to the information observed in the 
first half and the second half of the sequence, respectively, the authors then 
predicted each person' s choice in each problem on the basis of these average 
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payoffs. The predictive power of the payoffs computed from the seconcl 
half of the sequence clearly outperformed that of those computed from th~ 
first half. Whereas the first half predicted, on average, 59% of the choices, 
the second half predicted 75% of the choices; the difference between th~ 
two proportions was statistically significant (t(49) = -3.1, p = .003; two, 
tailed). 
Hertwig et al.'s findings suggest the existence of two phenomena. First, 
people may underestimate the objective probabilities of rare events in small 
samples, and, second, they may overweight the impact of recent events. As 
demonstrated, both phenomena can contribute independently to choices 
consistent with underweighting of rare events. Let us clarify, however, 
that we do not assume that people explicitly estimate outcome probabili, 
ties or explicitly combine outcomes and probability estimates in a fashior\ 
suggested by expected value theory, expected utility theory or prospect 
theory. Instead, we propose that people go through a cognitively far less 
taxing process of evaluating and updating the value of a gamble, resulting 
in choices that appear to reflect underweighting of rare events. In what 
follows, we propose a model of such a process. 
INFORMATION INTEGRATION IN DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE: 
THE VALUE-UPDATING MODEL 
How do people integrate sequentially sampled outcomes? Many learning 
studies pointto a weighted adjustment process in which a previous impres, 
sion of the value of an option is combined with a newly sampled outco1rn~ 
(see, e.g., Bush & Mosteller, 1955; March, 1996). We propose a specific vari, 
ant of a weighted adjustment mechanism and apply it to value updating 
in decisions from experience. In the value-updating model, a learner is as, 
sumed to update his or her estimate of the value of a gamble after each new 
draw from the payoff distribution by computing a weighted average of the 
previously estimated value and the value of the most recently experiencecl 
outcome. The model has three building blocks: 
Sampling rule: During sarnpling, each trial consists of a random draw 
frorn one of the two payoff distributions. The person stops searching 
after a total of s draws (with each payoff distribution being sampled 
s/2 tirnes). 
Choice rufe: When rnaking the choice, the person selects the gamble 
with the highest value as determined on the basis of the sampled 
outcornes. 
Updating rufe: Inalgebraic terms, theupdating mechanism can be written 
Aj(l) = (1 - w1)Aj(t -1) + (w1)v(x1), where Aj(t) represents the value 
of garnble j after t samples are drawn. This value is the weighted 
average of the value of the gamble based on the t - 1 previously 
The Role of Information Sampling in Risky Choice 85 
100 .--------------~ 
.§.. 80 
oActual 
aPredicted 
Q) 
:0 
E 60 
<11 
(!) 
:r: 40 
ä 
(/) 
~ 20 -
'ö 
.C: 
ü 
2 3 4 5 6 
H: (4, 0.8) (4, 0.2) (-3, 1) (-3, 1) (32, 0.1) (32, 0.025) 
L: (3, 1) (3, 0.25) (-32, 0. 1) (-4, 0.8) (3, 1) (3, 0.25) 
FIGURE 4.2. The proportion of people who selected H, the gamble with the higher 
expected value, in each choice problem and the corresponding proportion pre-
dicted by the value-adjustment model. 
drawn outcomes, Aj(t - 1), and the value of the outcome obtained in 
the most recently drawn outcome, x1• The weight accorded to the new 
outcome is w1 = (1/t)"', where rp is a recency parameter. When rp = 1, 
all outcomes are equallyweighted. When rp < 1, more recent outcomes 
receive more weight, implying a recency effect. When rp > 1, earlier 
outcomes receive more weight, implying a primacy effect. Finally, v(.) 
is prospect theory's value function, which is assumed tobe concave 
for gains and convex for losses (Kahneman & Tverksy, 1979): 
V X· -
1 
I
X~ 
( ,) - )..\xil" 
if Xi ::'.: 0, 
if Xi< 0. 
Although the value-updating model has four parameters, only the re-
cency parameter, rp, needs to be estimated from the data. The parame-
ters a from the gain value function and A from the loss value function 
are assumed to take the values estimated by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992; a = .88;).. = 2.25), and the number of draws, s, is taken tobe the 
empirically observed mean sample size for each choice problem (see 
Figure 4.1). 
We fit the model to the choices observed in Hertwig et al.'s study (2004). 
Figure 4.2 shows the actual and predicted (best mean-squared fit) choice 
proportions. The mean-squared deviation score between the proportions 
was .012, and the correlation between the actual and the predicted pro-
portions was .91. With the exception of Problem 1, the predictions closely 
tracked the observations. Moreover, the rp parameter was estimated to be 
0.29. As expected, this value implies a recency effect. 
In conclusion, the value-updating model suggests one way in which 
sampled outcomes are integrated into an impression of the value of a 
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gamble in the context of decisions from experience. In future studies of 
decisions from experience, this mechanism is flexible enough to take dif-
ferent degrees of sampling (i.e., sample sizes) into account (through s), and 
it allows for quantification of the recency effect. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In a review of all published studies examining risky choices made by hu-
man respondents between a sure option and a two-outcome gamble of 
equal expected value, Weber et al. (2004) assessed the prevalence of de-
cisions from description in the laboratory. Every single choice involved 
a decision from description. There is no doubt that important situations 
outside the laboratory call for decisions from description. Consider, fol' 
example, parents who must decide whether their child should receive th~ 
diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTaP) vaccine. By researching the DTaP 
vaccine at the National Immunization Program Website, for instance, par, 
ents will learn that the possible side effects are high fever (a temperature of 
more than 105°F) and seizures and that up to 1 child in 1,000 suffers fron\ 
the former and about 1 child in 14,000 suffers from the latter as a result of 
immunization. 
Yet circumstances often deny us access to thorough descriptions of op, 
tions' outcomes and their probabilities. One way to fill the void is to se, 
quentially sample information and update one's mental representation of 
the situation. According to an article in The New Yorker (Dubner, 2004), thi~ 
is how a thief named Blane Nordahl managed to steal millions of dollar~ 
worth of silver from scores of stately homes on the east coast of the Unite(]_ 
States. Burglary is fraught with risks, most of which cannot be estimate(]_ 
by consulting the Internet. Arguably the most important risk for a bur-
glar to assess is that of getting caught. Nordahl learned from experience 
that it was dangerous to have partners in crime because there was a high 
probability that, if they got caught, they would turn him in. So he workect 
alone. Experience also taught him to steal silver-which, unlike jewelry, for 
example, tends tobe stored on the ground floor of a home - and to work 
during the night rather than the day. Of course, the samples of experience 
on which risky choices are based can be vicarious as well as first-hand. 
Quoted in the same article in The New Yorker, Malcolm X's recollections of 
his early career as a burglar provide an example of decisions from vicarious 
experience: 
Ilearned from some of the pros, and from my experience, how important it was tobe 
careful and plan .... Burglary, properly executed, though it had its dangers, offered 
the maximum chances of success with the minimum risk. ... And if through some 
slip-up you were caught, later, by the police, there was never a positive eyewitness 
(Duhner, 2004, p. 76). 
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In other contexts (e.g., financial investment), decision makers have ac-
cess both to comprehensive statistics and to personal experience. Expert 
and novice decision makers often differ in the degree to which they rely 
on one type of information versus the other. For instance, in the domain 
of insurance, experts (i.e., actuaries) rely almost exclusively on summary 
statistics when pricing policies, whereas novices (i.e., insurance buyers) 
often use personal experience with the hazard to decide whether a price is 
fair. This can make people reluctant to buy actuarially fair or advantageous 
insurance policies for rare hazards like floods (Kunreuther et al., 1978). The 
difference between decisions from experience and decisions from descrip-
tion is one of a number of possible contributors to expert-novice differences 
in judgment and choice (for others, see Slovic & Weber, 2002). 
The experience-description distinction can also shed light on some strik-
ing similarities between the behavior of humans and other animals (see 
also Weber et al., 2004). Because animals do not share the human ability 
to process symbolic representations of risky prospects, all their decisions 
are decisions from experience. In a study of the foraging decisions made 
by bees, Real (1991) observed that "bumblebees underperceive rare events 
and overperceive common events" (p. 985). To explain why bees' "proba-
bility bias" diverges from that postulated in humans (in prospect theory's 
weighting function), Real cited, among other factors, the fact that bees' 
samples from payoff distributions (i.e., foraging patches) are truncated by 
memory constraints. When humans are placed in situations where they 
must make decisions based on experience and their experience is lim-
ited (by memory constraints or by a small number of encounters), they, 
like bumblebees, behave as if they underestimate the probability of rare 
events. 
A Mere Mention Lends Weight 
Why people choose as if they overweight rare events in decisions from de-
scription remains an open question in the literature (for a discussion, see 
Gonzalez & Wu, 1999), and we have no counterpart to the value-updating 
model to offer as an explanation. We suspect, however, that the overweight-
ing of rare events is one of several phenomena in which merely presenting 
a proposition appears to increase its subjective truth and psychological 
weight. For instance, merely asking people whether a particular person 
is a crook makes them more likely to believe that such a person is one 
(e.g., Wegner et al., 1981); merely considering a proposition enhances its 
subjective truth (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler et al., 1996), and merely imagining 
the occurrence of positive events (e.g., winning a free trip) or negative 
events (e.g., being arrested) increases the subjective likelihood of those 
events (Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982). We hypothesize that merely 
presenting a rare event may increase its psychological weight in a similar 
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way. The propositional representations of gambles in decisions frorn descri-
ption - for instance, "32 with probability .1; 0 otherwise" - put rnore equal 
emphasis on the two possible outcomes than the discrepancy between their 
actual probabilities of occurrence warrants. If attention translates into deci-
sion weight as some research suggests (Weber & Kirsner, 1996), then, other 
things being equal, the psychological weights of rare and comrnon events 
will indeed be closer to one another than they should be. Thus, the effect 
of mere presentation might explain underweighting of cornrnon events as 
well as overweighting of rare events in decisions from description. 
The mere presentation account raises interesting questions. For exarnple, 
would overweighting of rare events in decisions from description decrease 
or even vanish if the gambles were described in an analogical way? The 
structure of analogical representations reflects more the structure of what is 
represented than do propositional representations. For instance, the option 
"32 with probability .1; 0 otherwise" can be expressed as follows: "a randorn 
draw from the population {O, 0, 0, 0, 0, 32, 0, 0, 0, O}." In this representation, 
information regarding the relative frequency of the option' s outcornes can 
be read off directly. Moreover, to the extent that more attention needs to 
be allocated to the processing of the frequent event than the rare event, 
the resulting decision weights rnay more accurately reflect the objective 
probabilities. 
Small Samples Show Less Variability 
Reliance on small samples not only plays a role in decisions frorn expe-
rience but also contributes to the fact that people perceive the world as 
less variable than it actually is (Kareev, Arnon & Horwitz-Zeliger, 2002). 
In fact, underestimating the variance of populations is equivalent to un-
derweighting rare events. For instance, in Problem 6, about two-thirds of 
respondents encountered only the outcome O when they drew frorn the 
payoff distribution involving the rare event (Table 4.2). If they had used 
sample variability or lack thereof as an estimate of population variability 
without correcting for sample size, then they would have underestirnated 
the true variability in that option's payoff distribution. Consistent with 
this conclusion, Kareev et al. showed that people tend to perceive sarnple 
variability as smaller than it is and that reliance on srnall sarnples (the size 
of which is often related to working-memory capacity) causes the under-
estimation. 
Kareev et al. (2002) suggested that time constraints, lirnits in rnernory 
capacity, and lack of available data are key conditions under which peo-
ple perceive variability as smaller than it is (see also Kareev et al. in this 
volume). These may also be the conditions under which decisions frorn 
experience and decisions from description diverge. We think that even if 
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decision rnakers derive their decisions frorn large sarnples of outcornes, 
however, the psychological irnpact of a rare event rnay still deviate from 
its objective probability because recency could still amplify the impact of 
recently sarnpled outcornes. 
Primacy and Recency Join Forces 
In our analysis based on the value-updating model, we found evidence 
only for recency. However, whether it is .later or earlier observations in a 
sequential updating process that get more weight is a subject of dispute. 
Sorne researchers have found evidence of primacy (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, 
p. 172), others of recency (Davis, 1984), and still others of both effects 
(Anderson, 1981). In an effort to make sense out of this heterogeneous 
set of findings, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) proposed a belief-adjustment 
rnodel that predicts different types of order effects as a function of the na-
ture of the task (e.g., judging the value of an option after each outcome 
is drawn or only after sampling is complete), the complexity of the out-
come inforrnation [e.g., a single value, as in Hertwig et al.'s (2004) study, 
or a page of text describing a person], and the length of sarnpling. The key 
point here is that both prirnacy and recency effects will cause rare events 
to receive less weight than they deserve given their objective probability of 
occurrence. Because of the very rarity of rare events, most people are less 
likely to encounter rare events than frequent events both at the beginning 
and at the end of a sequence. 
EPILOGUE 
Let us return to the decks of the Pequod. On the second day of their three-
day chase of Moby Dick, the chief rnate, Starbuck, irnplored Ahab: 
Never, never wilt thoucapture him, old man-In Jesus' nameno more of this, that's 
worse than devil's madness .... Shall we keep chasing this murderous fish till he 
swamps the last man? Shall webe dragged by him to the bottom of the sea? Shall 
webe towed by him to the infernal world? Oh, oh, - Impiety and blasphemy to 
hunt more! (Melville, 1851/1993, p. 467) 
Ahab ignored the plea. In Melville's portrayal, to hunt down and kill Moby 
Dick was nothing less than Ahab's destiny. He had no choice but to con-
tinue the quest, destroying himself, his ship, and his crew in the process. 
Seen from the perspective of decisions from experience, one may speculate 
that Ahab sarnpled the hunt and the kill of "this murderous fish" in his 
irnagination innumerable times. And, in our imaginations at least, every 
one of us is master of the odds. 
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